

MEMORANDUM AND POINTS OF AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR  
CONTENTION I-A  
VIOLATION OF  
6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL  
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR  
CONTENTION I-A  
AS QUOTED IN STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, CITE AS 104 S.C.T.  
2052 (1984).

IN CASES IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT ACTED  
IN A WAY THAT PREVENTED DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM FUNC-  
TIONING EFFECTIVELY, WE HAVE REFUSED TO REQUIRE  
THE DEFENDANT, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A NEW TRIAL, TO  
DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS INJURED. IN GLASSER V.  
UNITED STATES, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76, 62 S.C.T. 457, 467-468,  
86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), FOR EXAMPLE, WE HELD: "TO DETERMINE  
THE PRECISE DEGREE OF PREJUDICE SUSTAINED BY  
[A DEFENDANT] AS A RESULT OF THE COURT'S  
APPOINTMENT OF [THE SAME COUNSEL FOR TWO  
CODEFENDANTS WITH CONFLICTING INTEREST] IS  
AT ONCE DIFFICULT AND UNNECESSARY. THE RIGHT  
TO HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS TOO  
FUNDAMENTAL AND ABSOLUTE TO ALLOW COURTS  
TO INDULGE IN NICE CALCULATIONS AS TO THE  
AMOUNT OF PREJUDICE ARISING FROM IT'S DENIAL."  
THUS, AN INQUIRY INTO A CLAIM OF HARMLESS ERROR  
HERE WOULD REQUIRE, UNLIKE MOST CASES,  
UNGUIDED SPECULATION" HOLLOWAY V. ARKANSAS,  
435 U.S. 475, 490-491, 98 S.C.T. 1173, 1181-1182, 55  
L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) EMPHASIS IN ORIGINAL

SEE HOLMES V. SOUTH CAROLINA (2006) 126 S.C.T. 1727, 547 U.S. 319, 164 L.Ed.2d.  
503, 74 USLW 4221 HOLDING: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT  
JUSTICE ALITO, HELD THAT EXCLUSION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE THIRD  
PARTY GUILT DENIED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, ABROGATING STATE V.  
GAY, 343 S.C. 543, 541 S.E.2d 541 VACATED AND REMANDED.

STATEMENT OF CASE. ON APPROX. 11-09-04, UPON APPOINTMENT OF CONFLICTING COUNSEL NEWTON,  
DEFENDANT MADE A THRESHOLD MARSDEN MOTION THAT WAS DENIED PREJUDICIASLBY HON. JUDGE FRECKEL.  
THE FAILURE TO INQUIRE INTO THE APPOINTMENT OF AN CONFLICTING COUNSEL VIOLATED PETITIONERS 6TH  
AND 14TH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES, AS WELL AS 6TH & 14TH AMEND. RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE  
ARGUMENT) ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

IN CASES IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT ACTED IN A WAY THAT  
PREVENTED DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM FUNCTIONING EFFECTIVELY, WE  
HAVE REFUSED TO REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN  
A NEW TRIAL, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS INJURED. IN  
GLASSER V. UNITED STATES, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467-468,  
66 L.Ed. 680 (1942), FOR EXAMPLE, WE HELD:

"TO DETERMINE THE PRECISE DEGREE OF PREJUDICE  
SUSTAINED BY [A DEFENDANT] AS A RESULT OF THE COURT'S  
APPOINTMENT OF [THE SAME COUNSEL FOR TWO CODEFENDANTS  
WITH CONFLICTING INTEREST] IS AT ONCE DIFFICULT AND  
UNNECESSARY. THE RIGHT TO HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF  
COUNSEL IS TOO FUNDAMENTAL AND ABSOLUTE TO ALLOW  
COURTS TO INDULGE IN NICE CALCULATIONS AS TO THE  
AMOUNT OF PREJUDICE ARISING FROM ITS DENIAL."

IN CHAPMAN V. CALIFORNIA, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d  
705 (1967), WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL  
RIGHTS ARE "SO BASIC TO A FAIR TRIAL THAT THEIR INFRACTION CAN  
NEVER BE TREATED AS HARMLESS ERROR." AMONG THESE RIGHTS  
IS THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL. *Id.*, AT  
23, *N. 8, 87 S.Ct., AT 827, N. 8;* SEE GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT, 372 U.S. 335,  
83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). THUS, AN INQUIRY INTO A CLAIM OF  
HARMLESS ERROR HERE WOULD REQUIRE, UNLIKE MOST CASES, UNSUBIAED SPECULATION.  
HOLLOWAY V. ARKANSAS, 435 U.S. 475, 490-491, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181-1182, 55 L.Ed. 2d 424 (1978) (HIGHLIGHTS IN ORIGINAL).